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CHAPTER 7
Epilogue
In the previous chapters I have only criticized Mill's views when I thought
it would help to explain them. I have tried to explain Mill's views on his
own terms and the success or failure of this study should be judged in the
light of this attempt. Should we stop here? There is always a good argu-
ment for detachment in an academic study, but does Mill not provoke us
to make a more personal comment? If you think of Mill as a gentle liberal
and'rather an old woman' there may be no reason for this.t Mill, how-
ever, was a radical with a definite view of what should (and would) happen
to society in the future. His prophecy has not come true, yet many of his
views remain topical. Mill provokes; at least he has provoked me to com-
pare his ethical pre-conceptions with my own anticipations of the future.
This chapter has been called an epilogue rather than a conclusion, be-
cause this comparison can only provide some personal answers, accepted
by some, rejected by others. In the following pages I shall discuss three
propositions which are derived from Mill's thought. Because they repre-
sent central issues in his thought my comment can only be provisional. In
discussing them in the light of actual problems I can only touch on these
problems and cannot deal with them in a systematic manner. Nevertheless
I hope that the reader will justify my attempt at illustrating the topical as-
pects of Mill's social thought. The more so, because a discussion of these
propositions leads up to the important question whether we should be on
the road to Utopia. In my opinion we owe Mill an ans\iler to this question.
I hope that my personal and provisional answer may provide a fitting end
to this study.
The three propositions are:
l. Liberty of action and thought wiII activate moral progress, because it
allows a creqtive minority to experiment with a new Art ol Living.z
2. 'what is economically needed is a better distribution, of which one in-
dispensable means is a sticter restraint on population'.3
3. A better organisation ol society cannot be achieved without the moral
improvement ol its members.
1. The first proposition was discussed in chapter two and in subsequent
chapters we have seen how it determined the character of Mill's elitism.
This proposition rests on two assumptions. In the first place that the exis-
tence of an élite is an irreducible fact of social life. The truth of this as-
sumption may be granted, but if we want to make a criticism of Mill's
proposition in this respect, it is that he paid too much attention to the vul-
nerability of the élite and too little attention to other groups of men. Mill
saw a nonconformist élite as the victim of an intolerant and conformist
multitude. fn our type of society there is more reason to draw attention to
a situation where a creative minoritv dominates the multitude.
The second assumption is that it is possible to reach an impartial judg-
ment of social problems and that the creative minority is particularly fit-
ted to make this judgment, because it is not influenced by political or
economic interests. It is this assumption in particular which must be criti-
cally examined in the light of our present day experience, before we can
know whether intellectual freedom will automaticallv further the common
good.
Our economic system has a great need for the bright and the creative, and
intellectuals may easily become instruments of technocratic power and
hurt the interests of the less gifted. Industrial societies have a great de-
mand for highly skilled workers and education has become the predomi-
nant factor in social mobility. There is still a great demand for unskilled
and semi-skilled work, but the demand may diminish if we are to have
computerized industries. Will these workers be fit for the new jobs which
can be offered to them? Or do we have to reckon with the fact that (say)
20010 of the potential labour force can eat, but no longer work, and that
the future will bring a ne\ry version of the paneftL et circenses? Michael
Young has described a utopia where everyone is rewarded according to
his talents. It is the type of society in which if you are young and talented
you will get very far, and if you are old or mediocre vou are a second
class citizen. A second class cttizen will not be bullied in the enlightened
atmosphere of 'meritocracy', he will be patronized.n
Some years ago a Leyden-team of sociologists undertook a study of the
problem why Dutch working class children are so little represented in sec-
ondary schools and universities. Van Heek, the leader of the team, offers
efficiency and social justice as reasons for justifying this research. He
writes: 'The significance of an efficient flow in education is not only accen-
tuated by the principle of justice, but also by social necessity: the necessity
to use the existing potential of talents as efficiently as is possible.'r Will
these principles - social justice and efficiency - suffice in the present si-
tuation? The Rise oÍ the Meritocracy is a social satire and Van Heek may
be right when he remarks that there need be no fear for meritocracy yet.o
What if the recommendations of Van Heek and his team will solve the
problem they set out to study? Suppose we can select the talented children
from all the different backgrounds with maximal efficiency? Then we can
expect he formation of an immutable social arrangement based on the de-
gree of education an individual will get. In such an arrangement he dan-
ger is imminent that the bright will exploit the dull. A situation which will
promote efficiency but hardly social justice. This is a somewhat far-fetched
speculation, but it may help us to treat the plea for equal educational
opportunities for everyone with care. Or rather we should see this plea in
the light of equality and justice.
Mill regarded it as the mission of the creative minority to criticize existing
social arrangements and to suggest better alternatives. The dilemma of a
present day critic seems to be at first sight that he must choose between
co-operation and protest, neither of which will make his criticism effec-
tive. It seems to me that the protesting critics who do not wish to take any
responsibility for the economic and social system as \rye have it, do not
make their task any easier by claiming too much. The postures and ideals
of many radical thinkers today show nothing more than the alienation of
the intellectual in our society. The legacy of the Romantics which is appa-
rent in many radical critics has much to do with this alienation. 'Ideologi-
cal individualism' (as Oerlemans calls it) was an attitude characteristic of
the Romantics.z In its pure and undiluted form it urges the individual to
liberate himself from the shackles of society by dedicating himself to the
pursuit of beauty and creation. Many radical critics have done nothing
more than to socialize the claims of the Romantics. Have these critics
asked themselves whether other people want freedom on the condition
that the entire social fabric must be put in jeopardy in the interest of cre-
ative freedom? It may be of interest to note what is involved in this ideal
of liberation by discussing H. Marcuse's Essay on Líberatíon.
In An Essay on LíberationMarcuse writes that man must find 'a nevi/ sen-
sibility' which will turn the production of quantity into the production of
quality. The satisfaction of our material needs is no longer our principal
problem.'What is now at stake are the needs themselves. At this stage, the
question is no longer: how can the individual satisfy his own needs with-
out hurting others, but rather: how can he satisfy his needs without hur-
ting himself, without reproducing, through his aspirations and satisfac-
tions, his dependence on an exploitative apparatus which, in satisfying his
needs, perpetuates his servitude?'e'We must learn to liberate our conscious-
ness from the exploitative forms of science and technology. Then we
will effect the 'Emergence of a new Reality Principle: under which a new
sensibility and a desublimated scientific intelligence would combine in the
creation of an aesthetic ethos.'e If we accept this ethos we shall be able -
through the mastery of form over content - to have a world of quality in-
stead of one of quantity. 'Form is the negation, the mastery of disorder,
violence, suffering, even when it presents disorder, violence, suffering.
This triumph of art is achieved by subjecting the content to the aesthetic
order.'lo This subjection of content to form is the supreme goal, and only
when this goal is fulfilled shall man be free. 'The concept of the primary
initial institutions of liberation is familiar enough and concrete enough:
collective ownership, collective control and planning of the means of pro-
duction and distribution. This is the foundation, a necessary but not a suf-
ficient condition for the alternative: it would make possible the usage of
all available resources for the abolition of poverty, which is the prerequi-
site for the turn from quantity into quality: the creation of a reality in ac-
cordance with the new sensitivity and the new consciousness.'ll
What impossible demands on man are made in the interests of Utopia. A
utopia on Marcuse's conditions can only become possible when all men
become creative artists and philosophers. But the majority of men has no
creative imagination. The average man is content to accept the life which
is offered to him. Supposing there \ilas a collective control and planning of
the means of production and distribution who would control these means?
The new aesthetes, I presume. Then one would have new spiritual des-
pots, who would base their program on their prejudice against vulgarity.
They would not be able to transform their aesthetic ethos into a new bond
of solidarity between men, for the majority of men would not accept this
ethos. It is all very well to write that 'Production would be redirected. .
to the creation of areas of withdrawal rather than massive fun and relax-
ation.'lz But people like massive fun and relaxation. To say that they are
manipulated and exploited because they like it is simple arrogance. The
danger of this spiritual despotism is not very real. The danger is more that
this type of crisicism will create a climate which is unfavourable for nec-
essary reform.
The substitution of a moral by an aesthetic judgment is very common
among members of the creative minority. Confronted by the vulgarity of
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the modern world, moved by visions of hannony and beauty many intel-
lectuals and artists experience a certain distaste for the world in which
they have to live. It so happens that I share this distaste with them. We
must, however, recognize this attitude for what it is: the expression of the
particulor interest of a minority who wants to explore new visions and new
knowledge. Hence its members claim the right for the mind to explore
new and exciting areas. I am not convinced that the majority of men share
this interest. Man is a conservative being that is not interested in originali-
ty and novelty for its own sake. Of the majority of men remains true what
Durkheim wrote: 'Ainsi, il n'est pas vrai que l'activité humaine puisse être
affranchie de tout frein. fl n'est rien au monde qui puisse jouir d'un tel
privilège. Car tout être, étant partie de I'univers, est relatif au reste de I'u-
nivers; sa nature et Ia manière dont il la manifeste ne dépendent donc pas
seulement de lui-même, mais des autres êtres qui, par suite, le contiennent
e.r lr rÈglenÍ 'rs-No man is free from society, and the majority of men do
not want to be free from society. They want freedom, but not anomic
freedom. The creative minority can escape from society into the spiritual
world. Or it can try to dictate new norms to society. It is not susceptible to
the danger of anomy. This is not so for other men. change can easily dis-
rupt their established ways of life. Whether it is a change of opinion or of
material conditions they tend to be the victims of change
The conclusion to be drawn from these arguments is that Mill's proposi-
tion that intellectual freedom will automatically serve the cause of progress
cannot be accepted. There is too close a link between the particular inter-
est of the minority in change and the technical change to which industrial
society is subjected. The intellectual and the artist can claim liberty as a
natural right, like everybody else, and when his activities are hurtful to the
common good he must be prepared to accept a curtailment of his libertv
of action and thought, like everybody else.u
What then should the creative minority do? Should its members accept the
developments they disapprove of? Far from it. They have the right to pur-
sue their particular interests (like everybody else), and, moràver, they
can claim in some respects an arbitral role. I agree with Cowling that the
creative minority should not try to back its slogans with the authority of
social science. But he goes too far when he maintains that social science
can offer no advice of general validity to society.
It is difficult to see how a modern industrial society can be run without
the help of social science. About the nature of economics Marshall wrote:
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'It is not a body of concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery of con-
crete truth.'lg And the same can be said about social science in general. It
can help to translate the ends about which a certain consensus has been
reached in the political process into the results that are aimed at. Precisely
because the 'invisible hand' has not been very efficient in constituting har-
mony between the unintentional effects of human actions, social science
can be an important instrument for helping to restore the broken line be-
tween intention and result.lo In this sense it can promote the common
good.
Should we not go a step further? There is no case, in my opinion, for ab-
solute moral relativism. Mill wrote in the beginning af. Utilitarianism that
there is not 'any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influ-
ence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant
consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling to ac-
knowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of
moral obligation. I might go much further, and say that to all those à pri-
orÍ [sic] moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian argu-
ments are indispensable.'l2 It is hard to dismiss this as a specimen of his
ruthless propaganda. If you deny that moral considerations have anything
to do with human happiness you are reduced to a rather eccentric posi-
tion. If on the contrary you admit that the happiness of all members of so-
ciety is an end in life you open the door to practical recommendations on
how to further the cause of happiness and you are even bound to criticize
attitudes and actions which seriously impair the happiness of certain indi-
viduals or groups.
There is no felicific calculus by which \rye can compute the happiness of
one individual against the happiness of another, but it would be against
common sense to deny that there are some requirements without which
the happiness of the greatest number becomes impossible. Should we not
qualify Cowling's criticism and allow for minimal and maximal require-
ments for the common good and say that utilitarian considerations of some
validity can only be admitted in relation to the minimal requirements?
Should we not say that there is a case for 'piecemeal social engineering'
when it brings about a better fulfilment of these minimal requirements?
The trouble with this argument is of course what should be regarded as
minimal requirements. Liberty, equality, security and a due regard for the
dignity of the individual seem to me essential requirements for human
happiness. But then again it is possible to give these requirements a min-
imal and a maximal interpretation. The definition becomes a bit easier to
formulate if we regard these requirements as interdependent: too much
equality for instance tends to encroach on liberty. And we can specify the
requirements in the following sense: liberty means the greatest measure of
personal freedom compatible with the administration of society, equality
means first of all equal opportunities, equal political rights and equal jus-
tice, and security means security against violence, unemployment, the con-
sequences of illness and the security of personal property. As far as hu-
man dignity is concerned the requirement must be maintained in a maxi-
mal sense. A human being, whatever his race, sex or social position
should be free from discrimination and exploitation, free from all pres-
sures which reduce him or her to a mere object.
In short, Mill's proposition is in the interest of the creative minority and
must be rejected as a general truth. Nonetheless the minority can play an
important role in promoting the common good, if it interprets the com-
mon good in the terms of the needs of all men. The creative minority does
not have to choose between co-operation with technocracy and ineffectual
protest against it. Its role is to study the effects of human action and to
translate these into terms of moral choice. It can tell its fellow citizens
what they must do to make their interests in harmony with the common
good. The choice itself is part of the political process. In the political pro-
cess it is entitled to defend its particular interest, but its role as arbiter and
adviser ends there. I know this view implies a minimal faith in man as a
rational being that can learn to see the connexion between his self-interest
and the common god. Whoever doubts this should not turn to Mill as a
mentor.
My criticism of Mill's proposition does not seriously impair the value of
his message to us. The principle of 'higher' utility should be regarded with
distrust, but it did not lead Mill to confuse matters of taste with matters of
common concern. And his enthusiasm for noble aspirations had an impor-
tant positive effect on his social thought, viz. it helped to extend the range
of his interests and thus increased the relevance of his thought for our
generation. This becomes evident from the second and third proposition.
2. The adoption of the proposition that what we need is a better distribu-
tion and a stricter restraint of population, and its implementation by legis-
lation certainly would have negative effects on the rate of economic
growth. A static population would mean that the expanding economy
would neither have the labourers nor the consumers to sustain expansion.
t87
Automatization may to some extent solve the problem of a lack of la-
bourers, but I doubt whether it will solve it altogether. And in Mill's time
there was no question of that. Of course the growth of population cannot
be stopped overnight, and a diminishing rate of growth might be an incen-
tive to mechanization which at least in the beginning would ensure the
same rate of economic growth as before. Would there not come a time
however, when eventually the dwindling rate of population growth would
start to act as a brake on economic development? A more equal distribu-
tion of property would bring new consumers into the market, and this
would have been particularly true for Mill's lifetime. Whether a subsequent
increase in demand would be able to replace the demand which automati-
cally increases when the population grows is questionable. And distribut-
ion would have a negative effect of its own on economic growth. A drastic
(and effective!) redistribution of property might impair the spirit of com-
mercial enterprise. On this matter Mill wrote: 'No doubt, persons have oc-
casionally exerted themselves more strenuously to acquire a fortune from
the hope of founding a family in perpetuity; but the mischiefs to society of
such perpetuities outweigh the value of this incentive to exertion, and the
incentives in the case of those who have the opportunity of making large
fortunes are strong enough without it.'18 Mill was here discussing his pro-
posal for a stiff law of inheritance. We have other means of redistribution
at our disposal which will certainly undermine the incentive to earn large
incomes. We can increase our taxes on capital and income for instance.
It was much easier for Mill than it is for us to accept the implication of his
proposition. Mill was certain that the growth of the population would
slow down economic growth anyway. We have learnt that this is not the
case. The production of material goods has increased much faster than the
population (in the industrial countries that is to say). In fact the increase
of material goods since the second world war has been so sensational that
the feeling could arise that we were finally entering that economic Eldora-
do (to quote an expression Keynes used for the world before the war of
I9I4) where no one needs fear starvation and unemployment and where
everyone can expect moderate comfort as his due.
In this situation of spectacular economic growth (das Wirtschaftswunder)
the conclusion seemed obvious that material goods could be brought with-
in the reach of everyone. With the help of economic growth a better dis-
tribution of wealth could be effected without conflict and with the pros-
pect of greater social harmony in the future. The prospect seemed breath-
taking. Pen wrote on this matter: '. . ., growth is a better general means of
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allaying the ancient conflict between rich and poor than large-scale and
harsh redistribution. . . . A simple calculation shows that drastic redistri-
bution operations - for instance topping off the excess over the average
income of the top L0 per cent of the recipients of income - would provide
the average man with an extra income of about 20 per cent; the same
effect would be achieved in, say, seven years of uninterrupted growth.
There are not enough people to make the operation worthwhile.'te A more
equal distribution we must have, but only in the course of economic
growth. One step further and you can say that measures for a better distri-
bution must not endanger future economic growth. This has become the
argument of practical politics and we should realize that it means that
economic growth has become the overriding end of society.
Pen writes quite rightly that in their incomes-policy 'socialism and liberal-
ism have drawn closer together in their economic ideas'. (ibid.) He means
that liberals and socialists have agreed that a sudden and harsh redistri-
bution will not do. What he writes is true in another sense. While the liber-
als have become more like socialists because they accept government in-
tervention in the economy, the socialists have become more like liberals
because they have come to accept the liberal conception of economic
growth. In this conception economic growth is seen as a process of bene-
ficial accumulation. The idea that it is better to have more material wealth
appeals to common sense and cannot be called specifically liberal. Attach-
ed, however, to the idea of beneficial accumulation is the concept of
'countervailing power' and this concept betrays its liberal ancestry.2o Ac-
cording to this concept the conflicts which inevitably occur in the course
of the economic process are or rather can be smoothed out, because they
counteract each other and thereby create an equilibrium of interests in so-
ciety. The concept has become even more popular in recent times when
people recognized that a fair amount of government intervention was
needed to keep the economic machinery in the best possible condition.
The government itself has become a countervailing power. It is only a
matter of historical justice that it was the liberal Keynes who found the
recipe for this mixture of government guidance and laissez laire.
It is understandable that Keynes' recipe appealed to men of sober jndg-
ment and social conscience. When we manage to make the economy func-
tion under optimal conditions we thereby create - according to the con-
ception of economic growth we have just discussed - a climate favour-
able to social reform. Economic growth ensures that the aims of industri-
al efficiency and social justice are identical.
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fects should be included in our conception of economic growth, these are
the effects which have escaped the counterbalance of powers and on these
effects we should rivet our attention, if we want to avoid that change will
go beyond anybody's capacity for change.
ïVhy should we want economic growth anyway given these prospects?
Mill asked the question, and we must - I think - ask the question again.
The practical value of this question is that it can help us to reject econom-
ic growth as an end in itself. This means that we must consider a scheme
of redistribution on its own merits and redistribution becomes an im-
portant issue if we decide to include measures against pollution in the cost
price of certain products. We must avoid a situation where certain prod-
ucts can only be bought by the rich, like cars for instance. The counter-
part of a curtailment of economic growth in the interest of social welfare
is a redistribution of the national income. In this sense Mill's proposition
is of direct value to our societv.
When we are planning for the future, redistribution of resources between
rich and poor countries is an even more important issue than redistribu-
tion of the wealth within an industrial country. A situation where the rich
countries are growing richer and the poor cotrntries comparatively poorer
is not conducive to world peace. And peace we must have if humanity is
to survive. A redistribution of resources will not bring about peace, but it
is an important condition for it.
There is no reason to be optimistic about the economic achievement of the
developing countries in the first development decade, 1960-1970. Experts
have computed that the rate of growth for developing countries reached
the five per cent level at the end of this decade. This average rate con-
ceals, however, considerable differences between the achievements of the
developing countries. Moreover, the population has increased at an aver-
age of 2.5olo a year, thus nearly ruling out the surplus created by econom-
ic growth.24 At the same time the industrial economies were growing
faster, thereby widening the gap between rich and poor countries. The
prospects for the second development decade are not very auspicious. The
1968 UNcTAD-conference in New Delhi ended in an impasse. The only
clear promise to be extorted from the rich countries was that they agreed
that as from a certain date they would reserye one per cent of their nation-
al income for aid to developing countries. Two reports have been pub-
lished with definite view as to when this should take place in the second
development decade. The 'Pearson-report' recommends that the devel-
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oped countries should increase their resource transfers to a minimum of
one per cent of their Gross National Product 'in no case later than 1975'.
Official development assistance should reach a level of 0.70 per cent
around t975, and 'in no case later than in 1980'.25 The 'Tinbergen-re-
port'is more radical in its recommendations: the target date for the trans-
fer of one percent must be t972 of which 0.75 per cent must be financed
out of public sources. Towards L975 0.80 per cent of the transfers must
have the nature of a grant.26 Carrière and Verburg have qualified the first
report as the feasible and the second repo'rt as the desirable one.27 Both
qualifications may be questioned. At the moment there is not much chance
that the recommendations of the Pearson-report will be fulfilled by the
rich countries. This report contains apart from the advice on the level of
transfer also a recommendation of a gradual reduction of tariff-barriers.
Nor is there any indication that the recommendations of the Tinbergen-re-
port represent the maximum possible effort of the developed countries
and will adequately help to reduce the problems of the developing coun-
tries.
Under these circumstances the advice that we must make a maximal
growth-effort ourselves in order to help the poor countries seems to me
positively harmful. In a comment on the Pearson-report Jolly has com-
puted that even with the proposals the report puts forward 'the gap will
continue to increase to three or four times its present absolute size by the
end of the century. It may even widen relatively'.28 If the developed
countries try to grow as fast as they can, the problem of the rich and the
poor countries will be aggravated. At the same time a measure of scepsis
is appropriate as to whether in such a situation of hectic growth the rich
countries will forget their minor problems in the interest of global social
security. Again Mill's proposition is relevant here. Economic growth must
not become an end in itself. Schemes for the redistribution of resources or
a revision of the division of labour on an international scale must be con-
sidered in the light of the minimal requirements of the common good. This
may well mean that we will have to take measures which will slow down
economic growth in the developed countries.
The value of Mill's proposition is that it forces us to take a second look at
economic growth as an end in itself. This means that we must judge the
effects of economic growth in the light of the minimal requirements of the
common good and try to avoid these effects when they are clearly oppo-
sed to these requirements. Even when this means a slowing down of eco-
nomic growth. It is easier for the individual than for a nation to give up the
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rat-race of competition. The connexion between the arms-race and eco-
nomic growth constitutes a formidable problem.zs It is small solace to
know that if the two super-powers cannot end the arms-race and if we
(meaning the rest of the world) cannot end our little escalations and prolif-
erations there is no need to discuss any other problems. The problem of
humanity will end with a great bang and that will be the end of it. Let us
be wildly optimistic for a moment and assume that the problem of global
and national security can be solved. Then one problem still remains: our
economy must continue to expand to create jobs for our growing popula-
tion. This brings us to the second part of Mill's proposition.
The population problem in present-day industrial societies is different
from that of Mill's time. It is not starvation but overcrowding which con-
fronts us. When we think of pollution we have a vision of smoking factory
chimneys. But the urban sprawl in the countryside, the washing-machines,
the cars, the organic and inorganic refuse which results from the density
of our population constitutes another and perhaps even more serious threat
to our physical surroundings. In a country like the Netherlands the time is
not far off when we will have to succeed in keeping the population static
at all costs. The population problem is a fair illustration of the type of
moral choice with which we are confronted. In the course of industrial
change people have learnt, by and large, to plan their families. The birth
rate has fallen quite considerably in all industrial countries, but so has the
death rate. At the moment a Dutch couple which has decided to take a
third child will contribute to the growth of the population if their decision
is not counteracted by the wish of a great number of other people to have
only two children. The counterbalancing effects of change have had a
beneficial influence on the behaviour of man, but the effects have not
been efficient enough. And the effects may even become counterproduc-
tive when a great number of people decide to have a third child rather
than to have a fourth car. Then you would have a 'baby-boom'. The solu-
tion of our population problem must be made a matter of conscious moral
choice. I am convinced that if \rye manage to stop the growth of our popu-
lation this will slow down economic growth. It may also mean that we will
be in a much better position for dealing with the ill-effects of economic
growth. Those who do believe that we cannot stop economic growth
nor control the ill-effects may prefer to look at Mill's proposition in this
light.
3. The last proposition is that a better arrangement of society cannot be
made without the moral improvement of its members.
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A friendly critic reading the manuscript of this study while it was still in
statu nascendi was unpleasantly struck by Mill's insistence on moral re-
form, moral progress and the superiority of altruism. This insistence on
moral ideals would be at the expense of political action. Generally speak-
ing the danger may be granted, but if we only think of the fact that Mill
urged the working class to seek political action it is clear thaÍ he did not
succumb to it. I think we should make a different objection against his
view of moral progress. Egoism and altruism are too neatly separated in
his view. In his effort to remain realistic Mill kept the stern individualistic
utilitarianism which he inherited intact and planted his altruistic higher
feelings on top of it. This meant that he had a blind spot for social prob-
lems susceptible for ad hoc reform. And in our present situation it is dif-
ficult to see how you can change an egoistic morality into an altruistic
morality. The members of industrial societies may be said to understand
their self-interest nowadays. A competitive society where every pressure
group has to watch its interests and has to bargain for them does not cre-
ate an atmosphere conducive to improvement of ties of solidarity beyond
these groups. And in another sense Mill's view of moral progress does not
help us. For while we must extend the range of our sympathies we also
must keep our interests in sight. To suggest that in order to make new and
unaccustomed moral choices we must sacrifice part of our interests seems
impracticable. We must learn to see these moral choices as belonging to
interests which transcend our interests, as we have conceived them before.
These objections must be granted. Yet Mill's view contains an element of
special merit. Altruism may be rather a silly word, but it draws attention
to the fact that we must make a special moral effort to extend our range of
sympathies. Take the aid to developing countries. In a vague general way
it may be said that aid should be given in the interest of world peace. It is
very difficult to argue the case that the aid is really in the interest of the
developed countries. These countries are becoming more self-sufficient
and more powerful every day, the effects of aid are uncertain and will on-
ly work in favour of global security in the long run. Why should they not
ignore the poverty and hunger of the Third World? This is a shortsighted
view, but it takes a special effort and a keen sense of human values to see
the link between our sympathies and our interests in this case. And there
is another element which is very valuable in Mill's view. Mill insisted that
the new moral choices must be translated into norÍns which are accepted
by every member of society (even when he disobeys them). Take the pop-
ulation problem. If we are to relinquish the process of muddling through
which we have adopted so far, we must have a clear nonn which says that
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it is anti-social to have more than a certain number of children. Reading
an interview with a worthy member of Dutch society I was struck by his
saying that he never had any trouble with his eight children, because his
was a family which stuck to the rules. He could not have said this if there
was a norm against large families. The only alternative to creating new
nonns, to creating a new consensus is bureaucratic control when the pop-
ulation problem becomes really pressing. We have already enough bu-
reaucratic control in our lives. I would rather plead for the creation of a
new consensus with which we can meet new situations.
Great men will be criticized, small men will be ignored. I hope my criti-
cism of Mill's propositions will be seen as a tribute to his greatness. I be-
lieve that our social criticism should be radical and sound, and in both
respects Mill sets an example. One question still remains to be answered:
Do we need to plan for Utopia? I believe that we have no alternative, if
we wish to fulfil the requirements of the common good. while we find
ourselves in unprecedented situatio,ns we must plan our moral objectives,
we must know for ourselves in what kind of society we want to live in the
future. We shall never reach Utopia. A frightfully dull place to live in
anyway. But we must plan for it.
NOTES CHAPTER 7.
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2 Mill never used the term 'creative minority'. As I have explained, his idea of an
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